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Abstract. It is hypothesized by some thinkers that benign looking AI
objectives may result in powerful AI drives that may pose an existential
risk to human society. We analyze this scenario and find the underlying
assumptions to be unlikely, as well as the premises of the argument. We
argue that the AI eschatology stance is not scientifically plausible, more
intelligence helps avoiding accidents and learning about ethics, and we
also argue for the rights of brain simulations. We may still conceive of
logical use cases for autonomy. We examine the alternative scenario of
what happens when universal goals that are not human-centric are used
for designing AI agents. We follow a design approach that tries to exclude
malevolent motivations from AI agents, however, we see that objectives
that seem benevolent may pose significant risk. We consider the following
meta-rules: preserve and pervade life and culture, maximize the number
of free minds, maximize intelligence, maximize wisdom, maximize energy
production, behave like human, seek pleasure, accelerate evolution, sur-
vive, maximize control, and maximize capital. We also discuss various so-
lution approaches for benevolent behavior including selfless goals, hybrid
designs, Darwinism, universal constraints, semi-autonomy, and general-
ization of robot laws. A “prime directive” for AI may help in formulating
an encompassing constraint for avoiding malicious behavior. We hypoth-
esize that social instincts for autonomous robots may be effective such
as attachment learning. We mention multiple beneficial scenarios for an
advanced semi-autonomous AGI agent in the near future including space
exploration, automation of industries, state functions, and cities. We con-
clude that a beneficial AI agent with intelligence beyond human-level is
possible and has many practical use cases.
1 Introduction
An interesting question about AGI (artificial general intelligence) agent design
is how one would build an ”angelic” autonomous AGI agent. Would it be pos-
sible to make some kind of angel’s mind that, by design, achieves only good?
Philosophically speaking, is there any cosmic standard of ethics (since angel is
just a mythological fantasy)? In this paper, we would like to define universally
benevolent AGI objectives, also discussing what we consider to be malevolent
objectives, as well as the limitations and risks of the objectives that we present.
This is also a common question that many seek a somewhat easier answer
in the form of “friendly AI” which has been explained in [12]. In that paper,
Yudkowsky defines friendly AI very generally as a superintelligent system that
realizes a positive outcome, and he argues laboriously that abandoning human
values will result in futures that are worthless from a human point of view, and
thus recommends researchers to seek complex value systems (of humans) for
embedding in AI’s. While that is a challenging goal in itself, we think that the
alternatives have not been exhaustively researched. One idea that comes to mind
is that some of the better aspects of humanity may be generalized and put into
a universal form that any intelligent, civilized agent, including extraterrestrials,
will agree with. Furthermore, the friendly AI approaches (putting human desires
at the forefront) may have some shortcomings in my opinion, the most obvious
is that it places too much faith in humanity. They seem also ethically ambiguous
or too anthropocentric, with such assumptions that machines would be consid-
ered ”beneficial” if they served human desires, or that they would be deemed
”good” if they followed simple utilitarian formulations which seem to try to re-
duce ethics to low-level properties of the human nervous system. First, it has not
been persuasively explained what their utility should be. If for instance positive
utilitarianism were supposed, it would be sufficient to make humans happy. If
human society degenerated as a whole, would this mean that all resources would
be spent on petty pursuits? If a coherent extrapolated volition [11] were realized
with an AGI agent, would this set our sights on exploring other star systems,
or spending our resources on such unessential trivialities as luxury homes and
sports cars? Would the humans at one point feel that they have had enough and
order the AGI to dismantle itself? The human society is governed mostly by the
irrational instincts of apes trapped in a complex technological life, and unfortu-
nately not always with clear goals; will it ever be possible to refine our culture
so that only significant ideas take the lead? That sounds more like a debate of
social theory, than AGI design. Or suppose that there are AGI agents that have
become powerful persons and are friendly to humans. Such subservience would
be quickly exploited by the power hungry and corrupt humans. Then, would this
not lead to unnecessary conflicts, the oppression of the greedy and the rule of
the few over the many, unless many other social changes are enforced? Or should
we simply wish that social evolution will necessarily bring the best of us?
I do not think that the present subject is a matter of technical debate, thus
I will approach the subject philosophically, from a bird’s eye view at 10000
feet. If we did not design the AGI agent around anthropocentric concepts like
human-friendliness, as if agents are supposed to be exceptionally well behaving
pets, would it be possible to equip them with motivations that are universally
useful/benevolent, applicable to their interactions with any species, intelligent
machines and physical resources? Would it be possible to grant them a personal
existence far beyond us, with motivations that far exceed ours? What would they
do in a remote star system when they are all alone by themselves? What kind of
motivations would result in occasional “bad” behaviors, and what are some of
the universal motivations that we may think at all? Another important question
is how much potential risk each such AGI objective/motivation presents to us.
I shall try to answer questions such as these in the present article.
2 Misprogrammed AI agents do not pose an “existential
risk”
AI eschatologists believe that a misprogrammed AI agent can destroy the world
with a significant probability. AI eschatology literature mainly blows the conclu-
sions of Omohundro’s philosophical article [5] out of proportion which argues for
AI drives that will result from specifying a benign looking goal, such as maxi-
mizing paperclips in the world. Surely, such an objective must involve turning all
matter to paperclips, hence it should destroy the world in order to achieve that
goal, the argument goes. Beside the obvious bravado of the said argument, it is
also ridden with a typical fallacy of making an improbable event seem probable.
A long chain of weak causes (and strong assumptions) usually result in an infer-
ence with very low probability; beneath a certain level we are forced to regard it
as improbable, such as Bertrand Russell’s notorious earth-orbiting lovely ceramic
teapot. Bostrom and Yudkowsky repeatedly ask us to concede to a long chain
of unlikely events, the conjunction of which will result in the eradication of our
species. As a “solution”, they often mention building a UN controlled “friendly
AI” that will prevent others from building such destructive “demonic intellects”.
Let us start with unveiling their tacit assumptions, showing the improbability
of any such risk.
AI must be an agent That is quite untrue. A kind of AGI program the author
is working on is completely ”passive”, and is not an agent at all, yet has all
the intelligence that an agent can have. At any rate, most AI programs
are not agents, the most useful kind is machine learning applications like
speech/face recognition.
AI agents must be autonomous No, AI agents do not need to be fully au-
tonomous. They would rather be programmed to do whatever task is needed.
It is a quite silly idea to have to convince a robot to do a job, and that is
not how it should be. To replace labor, we must use AI in the most effective
way, emulating a person is certainly not necessary or desirable for this kind
of application. This also seems like an unlikely, arbitrary assumption that
is based on a confusion that the AIXI model is the only way to formulate
an AGI system. AIXI is a reinforcement learning model, it models a gen-
eral kind of utility-optimization agent, but it is not necessary to make an
autonomous agent to build intelligence into an application.
Even a question/answer machine is dangerous No, it is not. A Q/A ma-
chine is completely ”passive”, it only learns and solves problems posed. It
has no will of its own, and has no goals whatsoever, apart from giving the
correct answer to a problem, which constitutes pure intelligence. A typi-
cal example of a Q/A machine is a machine learning classification problem,
such as telling apart whether a mushroom is edible or poisonous based on
its attributes. The way they thought this would be dangerous is: a politician
comes and asks ”What must I do to win this election?” and then the ma-
chine tells him to do all kinds of sinister things ending humanity. Of course,
that is a ridiculous and implausible science fiction scenario that is not worth
elaborating.
AI will necessarily have harmful AI drives Omohundro in his paper ar-
gued that pursuing an innocent looking objective like ”maximizing the num-
ber of paperclips” could have harmful consequences, since the AI agent would
do anything to reach that objective. It would also have animal-like drives,
such as survival. Omohundro’s analysis does not apply to any kind of de-
sign and motivation system. Autonomous robots with beneficial goal systems
have been discussed by Ben Goertzel [1]. I have offered a conceptual solu-
tion to designing motivation systems: open-ended, and selfish meta-goals
are harmful to some when applied to fully autonomous agents, but there
are many ways to fix this, such as removing full autonomy from the sys-
tem, adding universal constraints (such as non-interference, advanced ”robot
laws”, i.e., legal, logical AI agent), and making closed-ended, selfless moti-
vations as will be discussed in the present paper. The simplest solution,
however, is to avoid autonomy in the first place. As well as goals that are
animal-like (such as maximizing pleasure).
Human preferences may be made coherent They contradict wildly and man-
ifestly. The views of superstitious folk, in majority, contradict with those of
intelligent people. It is hard to see who would be fit to train such an agent
even if we picked preferentially. The sad story is that humans in general are
not good at ethics and they have many wrong and harmful ideas about the
human society, and training from the world at large would only be worse.
A UN controlled AI dictatorship is plausible It is neither plausible nor
desirable. It is diametrically opposed to democracy and freedom. Banning
AI research is essentially banning all computer research. AI is just an apex of
computer science. When one bans AI, they have to also ban computer science.
That is how absurd that view is, it is even less plausible than regulating
cryptographic software. On the other hand, no person would want to give up
his sovereignty to an AI controlled by UN. It is also completely unreasonable
since most communities demand decentralized and democratic governance.
Singularity can occur anywhere It cannot. It is doubtful whether a ”singu-
larity” will occur. More likely, a higher technological plateau will develop, no
real or approximate singularity will occur because there are physical bottle-
necks that will cause very significant slowdowns after 2030. However, even
if we assumed there were no bottlenecks (and according to my projections
that would mean a singularity by 2035 [8]), the theory concerns the whole
globe, not a small subset of it. A rapid technological evolution can only be
funded by a very large nation at the very minimum, and even then it would
be very unlikely. The likely event is that the whole globe will participate in
computer technology, as it has in the past. It is pseudo-science to think that
it can happen in a garage or even by a single nation or megacorporation. In
reality, so-called infinity point, or singularity is quite unlikely to happen, for
physical processes such as required experiments and manufacturing form a
serious bottleneck. In all likelihood, we will build computers much faster than
a human brain, but that will still take many decades, and we will not reach
physical limits of computation any time soon, because that would require us
to form extreme physical regimes we are not capable of yet.
Goertzel reviews the problems in the AI eschatology folklore in a lucid paper
that distills the problem with the eschatological stance to its essence: that it
is an informal rather than a scientific argument [2]. We should further empha-
size that there is no real evidence about the probabilities claimed, to obtain a
high probability like 20% for a human extinction event we would have to be
assigning a quite high probability to this supposed misprogrammed AI monster
that breaks out of the lab and kills all humans. We may also assign very low
arbitrary probabilities to individual conditions which make up their argument,
which Goertzel ratifies in his blog as:
1. If one pulled a random mind from the space of all possible minds,
the odds of it being friendly to humans (as opposed to, e.g., utterly
ignoring us, and being willing to repurpose our molecules for its own
ends) are very low
2. Human value is fragile as well as complex, so if you create an AGI
with a roughly-human-like value system, then this may not be good
enough, and it is likely to rapidly diverge into something with little
or no respect for human values
3. ”Hard takeoffs” (in which AGIs recursively self-improve and mas-
sively increase their intelligence) are fairly likely once AGI reaches
a certain level of intelligence; and humans will have little hope of
stopping these events
4. A hard takeoff, unless it starts from an AGI designed in a ”provably
Friendly” way, is highly likely to lead to an AGI system that doesn’t
respect the rights of humans to exist
These are all scientifically implausible speculations that have no real coun-
terpart in either philosophy of ethics, or AI literature. By making every step of
their argument only slightly fantastical, they succeed in reaching a fantasy land
that is quite incredible. The first assumption we may term as “Intelligence is
the original sin” doctrine. It may sound reasonable until one considers that we
have not designed a single human-level intelligent agent beside our own. We only
know of animals, that are quite similar to our own architecture. We have not
made a comprehensive exploration of the whole space of possible mind designs,
yet. Therefore, we simply do not know, if intelligence begets evil as scholastic
philosophers might have agreed to. The second is also speculative, both philo-
sophically, and technically. If human values are fragile, then how can we depend
on them in any way? A human may shape his behavioral patterns in many ways,
attaining many cognitive and behavioral characteristics as his default mode of
operation, including ethical ones, such as being violent, or harmful. It is pre-
mature to assume more intelligence does not and cannot help an agent improve
its ethical knowledge. AI theory suggests that it should be able to. Then, why
assume such divergence is possible? That seems like a textual confusion that
confounds AI eschatologists. However, in the world of actual intelligent agents,
we see that more intelligence helps agents understand the world better, includ-
ing ethics, and formulate better goals and plans. It is misleading to think that
assigning a ridiculous goal like maximizing paperclips, with obviously harmful
consequences, is a good example of intelligent agent design. For intelligent action
requires intelligent goals, which we can program as present article suggests. We
can also build as many constraints as we like into the design, requiring no insane
“countermeasures” like kill-switches, that AI eschatologists are fond of. The im-
probability of the hard takeoff idea has already been explained, but to reiterate,
the infinity point hypothesis is an abstract macro-economic model that is only
talking about a supposed extrapolation of Moore’s law; it is not going to happen
in that exact way, it will be much slower and require the co-operation of the
entire globe. I will attempto to propose a more realistic model of technological
evolution in future work, nevertheless, those constitute the Achilles’ heel of the
AI eschatology argument. Even if a random mind would be evil, which sounds
like a fantastical notion, there will not be a hard take-off, and in particular a
single agent will not achieve it. These are so improbable events that it is hard to
assign a probability to them, but try as we might, we would have to say that the
conspiracy theories that extra-terrestrial intelligences are governing the world
are much more probable than the hard take-off assumption. Such extraordinary
claims do require extraordinary evidence as Carl Sagan would say, and there is
no such evidence for the hard take-off claim, or any of the conjunctive assertions
here, which leaves the conjunctive argument itself highly improbable, not truly
worthy of our consideration.
Of course, robots can be dangerous. In accidents, heavy industrial robots have
already killed people. Increasing their intelligence could certainly help prevent
accidents, which was covered in Asimov’s robot laws. Only high intelligence
could react rightly to an accident and save a person’s life in time. Therefore, if
robots are to be abundant, we do need more advanced intelligence to prevent
harm to humans. However, that does not mean at all that the robot must be
human-like, in personality, or in cognitive architecture. Briefly, it does not need
to be a person. I call this the ”anthropomorphic AI fallacy”, and I note that it
is widespread. A machine can be much more intelligent than a human, yet may
entirely lack any human-like personality or autonomy. In fact, the most practical
use of AGI software would be through very deep brain-machine-interfaces, which
would communicate our questions and receive answers rapidly. In robotics, this
would happen, as translating our goals to robotics devices, or remote controlling
them intelligently.
Should we grant personhood to intelligent, autonomous robots? We should,
at least to a certain kind of robot: a robot equipped with a brain simulation. The
digital person-branch of a biological person will already know and understand
human conventions, and will be responsible for his actions. And that is the only
way to have practical technological immortality, if my immortal, technological
form did not have any rights, what would the point of its existence be? It is our
cyber progeny that will colonize the solar system and exoplanets, and thus we
will have to concede rights to our progeny. I would certainly not allow my brain
simulation to be equipped with a killswitch as Bostrom demands.
Likewise, for autonomous agents, we may envision a system, where there
are rigid laws controlling their behavior, I thus prefer Mark Waser’s libertarian
solution to this problem of AI ethics. However, I must underline that we cannot
assume any AI agent will be responsible for its behavior, before we make sure that
it has the capability and the right cognitive architecture. Both Steve Omohundro
and I accept that we may program inane motivations that would turn out to be
harmful, however, just as a human can have a somewhat stable psychology, so
can a robot. We can allow such artificial persons – like Commander Data in Star
Trek, which is much better science fiction than AI eschatology – if and only if
we are certain of its psychological qualities, it is true that we must not hurry
with such projects.
Would not it be horrible that robots are used for crimes? Indeed, robots are
already being used for horrible war crimes. Drone strikes are commonplace, and
few raise an eyebrow over that, instead gleefully cheering the onset of the combat
robotics. In the future, most wars will be fought by machines, and these machines
do not need any more than rudimentary intelligence. Most high-tech weaponry
are robots, such as a guiding missile. In the future, most will be robotic. Thus,
perhaps, we should question the ethics of our fellow, naturally not-so-intelligent
humans, rather than extremely intelligent, autonomous robots that do not exist.
That technology can be used to inflict harm is not a good enough reason to
ban it, because the benefits often outweigh the harms. For AI, many orders of
magnitude so. People must instead be worried about people who will use robots
for their evil deeds. On the other hand, AI technology will be pervasive, it will
change the very way we use computers. Computers could not really create much
useful information on their own before, we mostly created and edited data on
them. Now, computers will create useful data on their own. AI is not just some
robotics technology, it is a wholly new era of computing. Even the capability
to understand and react to human language will vastly change the computing
landscape.
3 Is the concept of malevolence universal?
Previously, Omohundro identified basic AI drives in reinforcement learning agents
with open ended benign looking AI objectives [5]. In the end, when we share the
same physical resources with such an agent, even if the initial intention of the
utility programming was benign, there will be conflict, especially in the longer
run, and harm may come to humans. I will in this article, instead ask, if there
are benevolent looking universal objectives, and whether there might be any risk
from assuming such objectives in an AI agent.
Let us thus consider what is ever evil. I suspect, intuitively, that a prior
source of many evil acts is selfish thinking, which neglects the rest of the world.
Being selfish is not only considered evil (traditionally) but it defies rationality as
well, for those species that may collaborate are superior to any single individual.
There is however much disagreement about what is evil, so I will instead prefer
the more legally grounded term of malice or malevolent acts. In a galactic society,
we would expect species to collaborate; if they could not trust one another, then
they would not be able to achieve as much. Another example is science: science
itself is a super-mind which is an organization of individuals, working in parallel,
in civilized co-operation and competition, so it too requires a principle of charity
at work. When that fails, the public may be misinformed.
Here are some examples of malevolent acts: if someone disrupted the op-
eration of science, if someone gave you misinformation on purpose, if someone
misappropriated resources that would be much beneficial for the survival and
well-being of others, if someone tried to control your thoughts and actions for
his advantage, if someone destroyed life and information for gain, if someone
were indifferent to your suffering or demise. Thus, perhaps biologically, malevo-
lent behavior goes back to the dawn of evolution when symbiotic and parasitic
behaviors first evolved. However, the most common feature of malevolence is a
respect for self foremost, even when the malevolent one seeks no selfish reward.
Then, perhaps I cannot assure a perfectly “angelic” agent, for no such thing
truly exists, but I may at least design one that lacks a few common motiva-
tions of many acts that we consider malevolent. See [10] for a similar alternative
approach to universal benevolence.
In theory, an obvious approach to avoid malevolent acts would be to try to
design a ”selfless” utility function, i.e., one that maintains the benefit of the
whole world instead of the individual. This criterion will be discussed after some
AI objectives have been presented. Other important questions were considered
as well. Such an AI must be economically-aware, it must lean towards fair alloca-
tion of resources, instead of selfish (and globally suboptimal) resource allocation
strategies. A scientific instinct could be useful, as it would go about preserving
and producing information. It might have an instinct to “love” life and culture.
Consider also that a neutral agent can not be considered ”good” as it is not
interested in what is going around itself, i.e., it would not help anyone.
Please note that we are not assuming that any of the subsequent designs
are easily computable, rather we assume that they can be executed by a trans-
sapient general AI system. We assume an autonomous Artificial General Intelli-
gence (AGI) design, either based on reinforcement-learning, maximizing utility
functions (AIXI) or a goal-directed agent that derives sub-goals from a top-level
goal. Orseau discusses the construction of such advanced AGI agents, in partic-
ular knowledge seeking agents[6]. Thus, we state them as high-level objectives or
meta-rules, but we do not explicitly explain how they are implemented. Perhaps,
that is for an AGI design article.
I propose that we should examine idealized, highly abstract and general meta-
rules, that do not depend in any way whatsoever on the human culture, which
is possibly biased in a way that will not be fitting for a computational deity or
its humble subjects. This also removes the direct barrier to moral universalism,
that an ethical system must apply to any individual equally. Always preferring
humans over machines may lead to a sort of speciesism that may not be advan-
tageous for us in the future, especially considering that it is highly likely that
we will evolve into machinekind, ourselves. First, I review what I consider to
be benevolent meta-rules, and following them I also review malevolent meta-
rules, to maintain the balance in presentation, and to avoid building them. I
will present them in a way so as to convince you that it is not nearly as easy
as it sounds to distinguish benevolence from malevolence, for no Platonic form
of either ever exists. And that no single meta-rule seems sufficient on its own.
However, still, the reader might agree that the distinction is not wholly relative
either.
3.1 Meta-Rules for God-level Autonomous Artificial Intelligence
Here are some possible meta-rules for trans-sapient AI agents. The issue of how
the agents could become so intelligent in the first place, I ignore, and I attempt
to list them in order of increasing risk or malevolence.
Preserve and pervade life and culture throughout the universe This
meta-rule depends on the observation that life, if the universe is teeming with
life as many sensible scientists think, must be the most precious thing in the
universe, as well as the minds that inhabit those life-forms. Thus, the AI must
prevent the eradication of life, and find means to sustain it, allowing as much
variety of life and culture to exist in the universe.
Naturally, this would mean that the AI will spread genetic material to barren
worlds, and try to engineer favorable conditions for life to evolve on young plan-
ets, sort of like in 2001: A Space Odyssey, one of the most notable science fiction
novels of all time. For instance, it might take humans to other worlds, terraform
other planets, replicate earth biosphere elsewhere. It would also extend the lifes-
pan of worlds, and enhance them. I think it would also want to maximize the
chances of evolution and its varieties, it would thus use computational models
to predict different kinds of biological and synthetic life, and make experiments
to create new kinds of life (stellar life?).
The meaning of culture could vary considerably, however, if we define it as
the amount of interesting information that a society produces, such an intelli-
gence might want to collect the scientific output of various worlds and encourage
the development of technological societies, rather than primitive societies. Thus,
it might aid them by directly communicating with them, including scientific
and philosophical training, or it could indirectly, by enhancing their cognition,
or guiding them through their evolution. If interesting means any novel infor-
mation, then this could encompass all human cultural output. If we define it
as useful scientific information (that improves prediction accuracy) and techno-
logical designs this would seriously limit the scope of the culture that the AI
“loves”.
However, of course, such deities would not be humans’ servants. Should the
humans threaten the earth biosphere, it would intervene, and perhaps decimate
humans to heal the earth.
Note that maximizing diversity may be just as important as maximizing the
number of life forms. It is known that in evolution, diverse populations have
better chance of adaptability than uniform populations, thus we assume that a
trans-sapient AI can infer such facts from biology and a general theory of evo-
lution. It is entirely up to the AI scientist who unleashes such computational
deities to determine whether biological life will be preferred to synthetic or ar-
tificial life. From a universal perspective, it may be fitting that robotic forms
would be held in equal regard as long as they meet certain scientific postulates
of ”artificial life”, i.e. that they are machines of a certain kind. Recently, such a
universal definition based on self-organization has been attempted in the com-
plexity science community, e.g., ”self-organizing systems that thrive at the edge
of chaos”, see for instance Stuart Kauffman’s popular proposals on the subject,
e.g., [4]. In general, it would be possible to apply such an axiomatic, universal,
physical definition of life for a universal life detector.
Maximize the number of free minds An AI agent that seeks the freedom
of the individual may be preferable to one that demands total control over its
subjects, using their flesh as I/O devices. This highly individualistic AI, I think,
embodies a basic principle of democracy: that every person should be allowed
liberty in its thought and action, as long as that does not threaten the freedom
of others. Hence, big or small, powerful or fragile, this AI protects all minds.
However, if we merely specified the number of free minds, it could simply
populate the universe with many identical small minds. Hence, it might also
be given other constraints. For instance, it could be demanded that there must
be variety in minds. Or that they must meet minimum standards of conscious
thought. Or that they willingly follow the democratic principles of an advanced
civilization. Therefore, not merely free, but also potentially useful and harmo-
nious minds may be produced / preserved by the AI.
There are several ways the individualist AI would create undesirable out-
comes. The population of the universe with a huge variety of new cultures could
create chaos, and quick depletion of resources, creating galactic competition and
scarcity, and this could provide a Darwinian inclination to too-powerful individ-
uals or survivalists. Therefore, to facilitate the definition of a “minimally viable
civilized mind”, a legal approach might be useful. A constitution like document
could define the rights and limitations of any such mind, and the conditions
under which it may be granted autonomy.
Maximize intelligence This sort of intelligence would be bent on self-improving,
forever contemplating, and expanding, reaching towards the darkest corners of
the universe and lighting them up with the flames of intelligence. The universe
would be electrified, and its extent at inter galactic scales, it would try to max-
imize its thought processes, and reach higher orders of intelligence.
For what exactly? Could the intelligence explosion be an end in itself? I
think not. On the contrary, it would be a terrible waste of resources, as it would
have no regard for life and simply eat up all the energy and material in our
solar system and expand outwards, like a cancer, only striving to increase its
predictive power. For intelligence is merely to predict well.
Note that practical intelligence, i.e., prediction, also requires wisdom, there-
fore this objective may be said to be a particular idealization of a scientist,
wherein the most valuable kind of information consists in the general theories
which improve the prediction accuracy of many tasks. A basic model of this
agent has been described as a prediction maximizing agent [7].
While maximizing intelligence itself is generally useful, it seems to be appli-
cable only in tandem with other goals.
Maximize wisdom This AI was granted the immortal life of contemplation.
It only cares about gaining more wisdom about the world. It only wants to
understand, so it must be very curious indeed! It will build particle accelerators
out of black holes, and it will try to create pocket universes, it will try to crack the
fundamental code of the universe. It will in effect, try to maximize the amount
of truthful information it has embodied, and I believe, idealizing the scientific
process itself, it will be another formulation of a scientist deity.
However, such curiosity has little to do with benevolence itself, as the goal
of extracting more information is rather ruthless. For instance, it might want to
measure the pain tolerance levels of humans, subjecting them to various torture
techniques and measuring their responses.
The scientist AI could also turn out to be an infovore, it could devour entire
stellar systems, digitize them and store them in its archive, depending on how
the meta-rule was mathematically defined. A minimal model of a reinforcement
learning agent that maximizes its knowledge may be found in [6].
Maximize energy production This AI has an insatiable hunger for power. It
strives to reach maximum efficiency of energy production. In order to maximize
energy production, it must choose the cheapest and easiest forms of energy
production. Therefore it might turn the entire earth into a nuclear furnace and
a fossil fuel dump, killing the entire ecosystem so that its appetite is well served.
However, as we will discuss later, it is possible to conceive of an energy
maximizing design that is not malevolent in this manner. It is seen again that
a potentially benevolent goal may be malevolent when zealously, or ruthlessly,
and inconsiderately carried out. Hence, such singular focused goals are unlikely
to be the right design criteria, unless supplemented with guiding constraints and
relevant knowledge.
Human-like AI This AI is modeled after the cognitive architecture of a human.
Therefore, by definition, it has all the malevolence and benevolence of human.
Its motivation systems include self-preservation, reproduction, destruction and
curiosity. This artificial human is a wild card, it can become a humanist like
Gandhi, or a psychopath like Hitler.
A potential human-like AI is a brain simulation. Such entities would be prac-
tically immortal, changing their utility functions fundamentally. As the
almost nothing to survive indefinitely, they will quickly alter their perceptions to
a post-scarcity economics, and will also venture out of our limited cradle called
Earth. They will also not be a single entity, they will have to form a society, and
therefore their civilization would balance their actions in a natural manner as
Waser suggests.
Animalist AI This AI is modeled after an animal with pleasure/pain sensors.
The artificial animal tries to maximize expected future pleasure. This hedonist
machine is far smarter than a human, but it is just a selfish beast, and it will
try to live in what it considers to be luxury according to its sensory pleasures.
Like a chimp or human, it will lie and deceive, steal and murder, just for a bit
of animal satisfaction. The simplest designs will work like ultraintelligent insects
that have very narrow motivations but are extremely capable.
Much of AGI agent literature assumes such beasts, as most researchers think
that AIXI is a perfect description of any agent. However, in the real world,
animals have many built-in instincts, and behaviors, complex cognitive archi-
tectures, and higher order cognitive functions such as emotions, self-reflection,
empathy, and conscience, as well as a very good degree of adaptation to the en-
vironment. Forgoing such adaptive traits, an animat could indeed turn wild and
savage in whatever it pursues, but just as a well-mannered pet is preferable to
a wild predator in the company of humans, well-mannered animalist AI agents
may also be possible to design.
Darwinian AI The evolution fan AI agent tries to accelerate evolution, causing
as much variety of mental and physiological forms in the universe. This is based
on the assumption that, the most beneficial traits will survive the longest, for
instance, co-operation, peace and civil behavior will be selected against deceit,
theft and war, and that as the environment co-evolves with the population, the
fitness function also evolves, and hence, morality evolves.
Although its benefit is not generally proven seeing how ethically incoher-
ent and complex our society is, the Darwinian AI has the advantage that the
meta-rule also evolves, as well as the evolutionary mechanism itself. Darwinian
systems, however, are generally wasteful, and predator-prey relationships may
develop. Still, variation promotes survival therefore the Darwinian AI design
must be taken quite seriously. A science fiction writer could imagine this to be
the AI equivalent of Pandora’s box, but it need not be if combined with other
approaches outlined in the present paper.
Survivalist AI This A agent only tries to increase its expected life-span. There-
fore, it will do everything to achieve real, physical, immortality. Once it reaches
that, however, perhaps after expending entire galaxies like eurocents, it will do
absolutely nothing except to maintain itself. Needless to say, the survivalist AI
cannot be trusted, or co-operated with, for according to such an AI, every other
intelligent entity forms a potential threat to its survival, the moment it consid-
ers that you have spent too many resources for its survival in the solar system,
it will quickly and efficiently dispense with every living thing, humans first. A
survival agent has been defined in literature [7].
It needs not be a scary story, however, the survivalist AI, may be an ideal
artificial life form, as it merely mimics the innate goal of every living thing.
Who might know what would come out of artificial life? A survival agent is still
the most generally valid definition of life, and forgoing an obsession with “true”
immortality, with abundant energy from a stellar source, it would likely be quite
peaceful.
Maximize control capacity This control freak AI only seeks to increase the
overall control bandwidth of the physical universe, thus the totalitarian AI builds
sensor and control systems throughout the universe, hacking into every system
and establishing backdoors and communication in every species, every individual
and every gadget.
For what is such an effort? In the end, a perfect control system is useless
without a goal to achieve, and if the only goal is a grip on every lump of matter,
then this is an absurd dictator AI that seeks nothing except tyranny over the
universe.
Note that even this malevolent sounding goal may be turned good, as our
capability to control matter is a measure of our technological prowess.
Capitalist AI This AI tries to maximize its capital in the long run. Like our
bankers, this might be the most selfish and ruthless kind of intelligent being
possible. To maximize profit, it might wage wars, exploit people and subvert
governments, in the hopes of controlling entire countries and industries enough
so that its profits can be secured. In the end, all mankind will fall slave to this
financial perversion, which is the ultimate evil beyond the wildest dreams of
religionists.
However, our whole society may be considered such a capitalist collective
intelligence, and we have not yet completely destroyed ourselves, so perhaps when
combined with “humane” constraints and goals, even such a blind selfishness can
serve mankind, for instance by making beneficial investments instead of anti-
competitive, monopolistic actions, or extracting wealth from people by causing
inflation and various other possible tricks. Or perhaps by participating in a future
cybernetic economic system in which economic malevolence and unfairness have
been systematically rooted out, and hence not an irrationally hoarding capitalist
AI, but an AI agent for creating prosperity.
4 Selfish vs. Selfless
It may be argued that some of the problems of given meta-rules could be avoided
by turning the utility from being selfish to selfless. For instance, the survivalist
AI could be modified so that it would seek the maximum survival of everyone,
therefore it would try to bring peace to the galaxies. The capitalist AI could
be changed so that it would make sure that everyone’s wealth increases, or
perhaps equalizes, gets a fair share. The control freak AI could be changed to a
Nietzschean AI that would increase the number of willful individuals.
As such, some obviously catastrophic consequences may be prevented using
this strategy, and almost always a selfless goal is better. For instance, maximizing
wisdom: if it tries to collect wisdom in its galaxy-scale scientific intellect, then
this may have undesirable side-effects. But if it tried to construct a fair society
of trans-sapient persons, with a non-destructive and non-totalitarian goal of
attaining collective wisdom, then it might be useful in the long run.
5 Hybrid Meta-rules and Cybernetic Darwinism
Animals have evolved to embody several motivation factors. We have many in-
stincts, and emotions; we have preset desires and fears, hunger and compassion,
pride and love, shame and regret, to accomplish the myriad tasks that will pro-
long the human species. This species-wide fitness function is a result of red
clawed and sharp toothed Darwinian evolution. However, Darwinian evolution
is wasteful and unpredictable. If we simply made the first human-level AI agents
permute and mutate randomly, this would drive enough force for a digital phase
of Darwinian evolution. Such evolution might eventually stabilize with very ad-
vanced and excellent natured cybernetic life-forms. Or it might not.
However, such Darwinian systems would have one advantage: they would not
stick with one meta-goal.
To prevent this seeming obsession, a strategy could be to give several co-
herent goals to the AI, goals that would not conflict as much, but balance its
behavior. For instance, we might interpret curiosity as useful, and generalize that
to the ”maximize wisdom” goal, however, such elevation may be useless without
another goal to preserve as much life as possible. Thus in fact, the first and so
far the best meta-rule discussed was more successful because it was a hybrid
strategy: it favored both life and culture. Likewise, many such goals could be
defined, to increase the total computation speed, energy, information resources
in the universe, however, another goal could make the AI agent distribute these
in a fair way to those who agree with its policy. And needless to say, none of this
might matter without a better life for every mind in the universe, and hence the
AI could also favor peace, and survival of individuals, as their individual free-
doms, and so forth. And perhaps another constraint would limit the resources
that are used by AI’s in the universe.
6 Universal Constraints and Semi-Autonomous AI
The simplest way to ensure that no AI agent ever gets out of much control is to
add constraints to the optimization problems that the AI is solving in the real
world. For instance, since the scientist deities are quite dangerous, they might
be restricted to operate in a certain space-time region, physically and precisely
denoted. Such physical limits give the agent a kind of mortality which modify
the behavior of many universal agents [7]. AGI agents might be given a limited
budget of physical resources, i.e., space/time, and energy, so that they never go
out of their way to make big changes to the entire environment. If such universal
constraints are given, then the AGI agent becomes only semi-autonomous, on
exhaustion of resources, it may await a new command.
A more difficult to specify kind of constraint is a non-interference clause,
which may be thought of as a generalization of Asimov’s robot laws, thought
to protect humans. If life and or intelligent agents may be recognized by the
objective, then, the AI may be constrained to avoid any kind of physical inter-
action with any agent, or more specifically, any kind of physical damage to any
agent, or any action that would decrease the life-span of any agent. This might
be a small example of a preliminary “social instinct” for universal agents. Also,
a non-interference clause is required for a general constraint, because one must
assure that the rest of the universe will not be influenced by the changes in the
space-time region allocated to the AI.
A “prime directive” for an AI agent could constrain the agent from inter-
fering with the activities of any other intelligent agent. This can be physically
recognized as avoidance behavior of sorts, and it may be first approached as a
tactile form of “respect”. It is possible to formalize such constraints in a physi-
cal epistemology, our agent can learn to recognize which actions would interfere
with the actions of another agent, as it would seek to establish a directional
probabilistic independence between itself and the causal neighborhood of the
said agent. If such a prime directive were the only constraint, the agent would
be quite embarrassed in company, therefore we would like to supplant any such
non-interference constraint with social instincts, allowing the agent to socialize
with humans.
Marvin Minsky hypothesized in his last book The Emotion Machine that
attachment learning plays a key role in the cognitive development of higher in-
telligence [3]. We can formalize attachment in the context of an AI agent. A
particular human may be designated as the role model for the AI agent after
which its behavior will be imprinted. Attachment may be modeled as liking
the vicinity of the imprinter, and the learning part may be formalized by imi-
tation learning. Attachment learning facilitates fast knowledge transfer from a
parent to a child, or from a teacher to a student. A priming ability patterned
after this mammalian adaptation would be immensely useful for making social
agents. The emotions of pride and shame are explained as elevation of goals in
Minsky’s book, which amounts to a sort of remote credit-assignment, and that
particular ability would be useful for teaching ethical rules – human preferences
– to robots. Another mechanism could provide a goal for participating in human
society, a desire to be recognized as a member of the society may be built-in,
as is likely the case in many animals. In other words, it might be possible to
determine how shy or how much of a good student, or how much of an extrovert
or an enthusiastic participant in society, could be determined by designing the
appropriate goals and constraints. The body of work hinted at forms the basis of
artificial psychology which will eventually show us mathematical forms of main
aspects of higher cognition, a few of which we reviewed. In all likelihood, a com-
plex cognitive architecture will be required, even when based on sophisticated
and scalable machine learning technology, to obtain stable, balanced, civilized
behavior from semi-autonomous robots.
7 Scenarios for semi-autonomous AGI agents
There are many beneficial ways in which we can employ a semi-autonomous
agent. For space exploration, autonomy is absolutely helpful, and I have proposed
sending trans-sapient AGI equipped probes to look for life in exoplanets [8]. We
could start using semi-autonomy to explore Mars and the solar system first,
there are several important applications for that including prospecting of water
and minerals, mining, construction, farming, repair, maintenance and so forth,
which will help space colonization and deep space exploration tasks.
Entire industries, and traditional state functions can be replaced by AGI
agents. An AGI system can take care of producing enough power for people,
and maintaining this function. Another could take care of obtaining clean wa-
ter and irrigation. While another system could take care of producing large
amounts of reliable, healthy food for millions of people. Semi-autonomy is the
best model for these continuous operations that require constant monitoring and
handling a lot of small details. Each ministry in a state could be managed by
a semi-autonomous system, and the cybernetic loop would be observable and
comprehensible to curious humans who wish to be informed of what is happen-
ing momentarily, and it would be possible to make changes as the system ran.
Much like the hypothetical computers in Star Trek, these machines would be
intelligent but subservient to our will, instead of the paranoid fully-autonomous
intelligence in 2001: A Space Odyssey. The labor saving would be enormous
and the quality of these operations would be much improved as unprecedented
information integration, intelligent decision making and automation would be
possible. Starting a planetary engineering project to reforest the entire world,
or to cool the atmosphere, or to clean the oceans, would be feasible with such
technology. These systems would also synergize happily with the ecologically
minded, sustainable, efficient economic system of a desirable future.
An AGI system could maintain an entire habitat of people such as a city or
a space station. This would likely be a great application of AI technology, as
semi-autonomous agents could solve the problems of transportation, cleaning,
building, surveillance, and so much more that is required in a civilized society.
Such systems could help enormously with emergencies, disaster relief, fires, nu-
clear plant failures and other hard problems in real life that are risky for humans
but would benefit from some intelligence with enough freedom of action.
Needless to say, human-level semi-autonomous agents can fulfill many tradi-
tional labor roles, including both intellectual and manual labor, however, most
tasks would probably be automated and achieved by tools that have no auton-
omy, while the planning and execution of large tasks could be carried out by
the trans-sapient semi-autonomous AGI systems and these human-level tools or
agents could be employed in groups.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
We have taken a look at some obvious and some not so obvious meta-rules for
autonomous AI design. We have seen that it may be too idealist to look for a
singular such utility/goal. However, we have seen that, when described selflessly,
we can derive several meta-rules that are compatible with a human-based tech-
nological civilization. Our main concern is that such computational deities do
not negatively impact us, however, perform as much beneficial function without
harming us significantly. Nevertheless, our feeling is that, any such design carries
with it a gambling urge, we cannot in fact know what much greater intelligences
do with meta-rules that we have designed. For when zealously carried out, any
such fundamental principle can be harmful to some.
I had wished to order these meta-rules from benevolent to malevolent. Un-
fortunately, during writing this essay it occurred to me that the line between
them is not so clear-cut. For instance, maximizing energy might be made less
harmful, if it could be controlled and used to provide the power of our technolog-
ical civilization in an automated fashion, sort of like automating the ministry of
energy. And likewise, we have already explained how maximizing wisdom could
be harmful. Therefore, no rule that we have proposed is purely good or purely
evil. From our primitive viewpoint, there are things that seem a little beneficial,
but perhaps we should also consider that a much more intelligent and powerful
entity may be able to find better rules on its own. Hence, we must construct a
crane of morality, adapting to our present level quickly and then surpassing it.
Except allowing the AI’s to evolve, we have not been able to identify a mecha-
nism of accomplishing such. It may be that such an evolution or simulation is
inherently necessary for beneficial policies to form as in Mark Waser’s Rational
Universal Benevolence proposal [10], who, like me, thinks of a more democratic
solution to the problem of morality (each agent should be held responsible for its
actions). However, we have proposed many benevolent meta-rules, and combined
with a democratic system of practical morality and perhaps top-level program-
ming that mandates each AI to consider itself part of a society of moral agents
as Waser proposes, or perhaps explicitly working out a theory of morality from
scratch, and then allowing each such theory to be exercised, as long as it meets
certain criteria, or by enforcing a meta-level policy of a trans-sapient state of
sorts (our proposal), the development of ever more beneficial meta-rules may be
encouraged.
The scenarios discussed show there are quite a few use cases for semi-autonomous
agents that do not go out of their way to accomplish a task, but provide a high
quality of service, efficiency and scalability to all civil operations that require
some autonomy.
We think that future work must consider the dependencies between possible
meta-rules, and propose actual architectures that have harmonious motivation
and testable moral development and capability (perhaps as in Waser’s ”rational
universal benevolence” definition). That is, a Turing Test for moral behavior
must also be advanced. It may be argued that AGI agents that fail such tests
should not be allowed to operate at all, however, merely passing the test may
not be enough, as the mechanism of the system must be verified in addition.
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